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In the UK, a person or organisation that creates risk is required to manage and control that risk so that it is reduced ‘So Far As Is 
Reasonably Practicable’ (SFAIRP). How the risk is managed is to be determined by those who create the risk. They have a duty to 
demonstrate that they have taken action to ensure all risk is reduced SFAIRP and must have documentary evidence, for example 
a risk assessment or safety case, to prove that they manage the risks their activities create. The UK Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) does not tell organisations how to manage the risks they create but does inspect the quality of risk identification and 
management. This paper gives a brief overview of where responsibility for occupational health and safety lies in the UK, and how 
risk should be managed through risk assessment. The focus of the paper is three recent major UK incidents, all involving fatalities, 
and all of which were wholly avoidable if risks had been properly assessed and managed. The paper concludes with an analysis of 
the common failings of risk assessments and key actions for improvement.
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Introduction
Prior to 1974 the UK had spent the preceding 150 years gene-
rating a large number of  Health and Safety laws focused 
on individual industries, and even individual regions of  the 
country. These laws, covering work places such as factories, 
offices, railway premises etc., were narrow in scope and often 
had inconsistencies between them.
Recognising that different laws for different industries 
was con fusing and complex, the UK Government set up a 
com mittee in 1970, led by Lord Robens, to recommend a 
way forward. The resulting Robens Report [1] recommended 
‘the unification within a single comprehensive framework of 
legisl ation of the main Statutes bearing on safety and health at 
work’ and ‘the establishment of a national Safety and Health 
Au thority’. This gave rise to the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 [2] and the creation of  the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) as the regulatory authority for Industrial Occupational 
Health and Safety in the UK. The short guide to Health and 
Safety Regulation in the UK [3] provides a summary of  the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and states ‘The main re-
quire ment on employers is to carry out a risk assessment. Em-
ploy ers with five or more employees need to record the signifi cant 
findings of the risk assessment.’
This article will introduce the risk assessment in the UK 
and analyze some cases of occupational accident with the risk 
as sessment model.
Legal Responsibilities under the Health 
and Safety at Work Act 1974
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 places responsibility 
not only on employers but also on designers, manufacturers 
and suppliers to ensure that articles and substances are safe for 
use so far as is reasonably practicable, and on every employee 
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while at work to take reasonable care of  him or herself, and 
of any other person who may be affected by his or her actions. 
The legal responsibilities of employers are summarised in Fig. 
1 [4].
It is important to note that ‘Sanctions include fines, im-
prisonment and disqualification’. In the UK, company directors 
and managers can be found personally liable of negligence, or 
indeed manslaughter, if  someone is injured or killed and HSE 
finds that there was no suitable and sufficient risk assessment 
covering the activities involved. ‘Unlimited fines’ are allowed in 
law but, depending upon the seriousness of the offence and the 
ability of the individual or organisation to pay, fines are usually 
in the range of several tens of thousands of pounds to several 
million pounds. In addition, individuals may be imprisoned if  
held personally liable. In a recent legal action, where two fire 
fighters were killed as a result of the incorrect storage of fire-
works, two company directors were jailed for 5 and 7 years res-
pectively [5].
A basic tenet of the UK Health and Safety System is that 
the person or organisation that creates risk must clearly assess 
that risk and ensure that it is reduced ‘So Far As Is Reasonably 
Prac ticable’ (SFAIRP) through design, management and proce-
dural measures. ‘Reasonably Practicable’ involves weighing a 
risk against the difficulty, time and money needed to control 
it. Thus, SFAIRP describes the level to which HSE expects to 
see workplace risks controlled. Using “reasonably practicable” 
allows HSE to set goals for organisations, rather than being 
pre scriptive. This flexibility is a great advantage but it requires 
judge ment too. In the great majority of cases, HSE can make this 
judgement by referring to existing ‘industry good practice’ that 
has been established by a process of  discussion with in dustry 
stakeholders to achieve a consensus about what is ‘SFAIRP’. For 
high hazards, complex or novel situations, HSE builds on good 
practice, using, for example, cost-benefit analysis, to inform 
judgement.
The reason for placing the responsibility with the or-
ganisation creating the risk is that it is impossible for HSE to 
be expert in the operation of every technology and workplace, 
especially at the rate of  technology development. HSE does 
provide generic advice on how to complete a Risk Assessment 
[6], and provides Approved Codes Of Practice [7] for specific 
industries e.g. construction and mining, providing more de-
tailed guidance on how to manage common risks within those 
industry sectors.
A Brief Guide to 
Risk Assessment Methods
HSE has published a guide to Risk Assessment [8] which iden-
tifies the key steps. These are outlined in Fig. 2.
1) What could go wrong? Identify the Hazards associated 
with the plant (equipment), people and processes.
2) How bad could it be? What harm could be caused to 
plant, people (employees and the public) and the en vi-
ron ment (land, water, air, plants, animals).
3) What is already being done to minimise the risk? Iden-
tify the existing controls.
4) What new actions are required to further reduce the risk? 
Iden tify the new controls that are needed, who will take 
res ponsibility for putting them in place and by when.
5) Review and update the above 4 steps at suitable time 
intervals.
Fig. 1. The legal responsibilities of 
em ployers [4].
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The risk assessment steps allow the generation of  a list 
of  risks but for many people it can beg the question ‘where 
should I focus, what are the biggest risks?’ There are many 
tools to provide quantitative risk assessment including the Risk 
Matrix [9] approach shown in Fig. 3, which considers pro-
bability and impact, and the Risk Graph [10] of Fig. 4, which 
adds additional dimensions of  exposure to the risk and the 
possibility of avoidance of harm.
The Risk Matrix questions the probability of  certain 
levels of  harm. Depending upon the level of  harm and the 
probability, the risk is labelled as High, Medium or Low. The 
Risk Graph of Fig. 4 extends this basic approach.
Here, the risk consequence (level of  harm) has its prob-
ability derived from a number of  factors. In this example it 
includes the severity of  harm, the exposure to harm (for ex-
ample the amount of time per day an individual is exposed to 
the risk), the probability that the event will occur for the given 
exposure and the probability of  avoiding harm should the 
hazardous event occur.
The best results from these tools are achieved when a 
team of  people undertake the risk assessment together. The 
risk assessment team should be multi-disciplinary including, 
for example, those who work in the area being assessed, a 
manager, a health and safety specialist and a person who 
is not closely associated with the work area. The latter will 
bring a ‘fresh pair of eyes’ and often sees risks that those very 
familiar with the area being assessed overlook due to their over 
familiarity.
High quality risk assessments are usually achieved quite 
easily for individual pieces of equipment or self contained work 
areas. The most usual source of  error is between equipment 
or work areas. Consider for example a small manufacturing 
process where Team A take raw material and prepare it 
for initial fabrication by Team B. Team B, once they have 
completed initial fabrication pass to Team C for finishing. Once 
Team C have finished the product it is ready for packaging and 
shipment by Team D. The best way for this organisation to risk 
assess their manufacturing process is first to have each Team 
A-D assess their own work and then for representatives of each 
Team A-D to form a new team to complete a ‘whole process’ 
risk assessment using both the information on the individual 
risk assessments and considering the interactions between 
processes. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.
It should be remembered when undertaking the risk 
assessments:
· What could go wrong with the plant (equipment), people 
or processes?
· How bad could it be?
· What actions are required to ensure risk is reduced 
SFAIRP?
In addition, when undertaking the Risk Assessments, the 
team must remember the responsibilities:
· Of the employer to ensure work activities do not en-
danger anybody
Fig. 2. HSE’s risk assessment process.
Fig. 3. Risk matrix.
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· Of anyone who designs, manufactures or supplies an 
article or substance for use at work to ensure that it is 
safe
· Of employees to ensure that they do not endanger them-
selves or anyone else who may be affected by their work
Case Studies: What Went Wrong 
When Risk Assessments Were Not 
Completed Correctly?
Three case studies are now presented to illustrate the conse-
quences of  not undertaking a suitable and sufficient risk 
assessment. In all cases, there was a loss of life that was com-
pletely avoidable if  the risk assessment had been completed 
properly and acted upon.
Case Study 1: Dreamspace, 
July 2006, 2 Fatalities, 27 Injured
Dreamspace was a large inflatable structure inside which 
members of  the public could walk around to experience a 
dream-like world of light and sound. The structure is shown in 
Figs 6, 7. It comprised 156 inflatable ‘cells’, each 5m high. The 
complete structure was 50 × 50 m in area.
The structure was designed for its artistic merit and the 
Fig. 4. Risk graph [10].
Fig. 5. How to risk assess a multi-stage process.
Fig. 6. Dreamspace in park.
Fig. 7. DreamSpace model.
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focus of  the Designer was on the dream-like experience that 
participants would enjoy. The structure was assembled and 
inflated by a Contract Company on public land, a park con-
trolled by a Public Park Authority. All three parties, the De-
signer, the Contract Company and the Public Park Authority, 
had legal responsibility for the health and safety of  the staff 
who would operate the structure and the public who would 
visit the park.
The structure lifted up to a near vertical position, ‘like a 
sail’, as shown in Fig. 8, when the wind unexpectedly changed 
direction. This occurred while members of  the public were 
inside the structure and others were surrounding the structure 
as it fell back to earth. Two people were killed and 27 injured. 
HSL undertook an investigation and determined that 
the structure was tethered by 22 ropes and pegs distributed 
around the perimeter of the structure. These tethers and pegs 
obviously failed to hold the structure in place. HSL then in-
vestigated the risk assessments that had been undertaken 
asking many questions. For example; had the structure been 
designed to withstand wind conditions? (The wind conditions 
were not abnormal for the UK). Had engineering calculations 
been undertaken to determine the loading that various 
weather conditions would impose on the structure? Had 
these calculations determined the type (strength), number and 
positioning of tethers and pegs? Etc.
HSE successfully prosecuted all parties, the Designer, the 
Contract Company and the Public Park Authority, for failing 
to protect the health and safety of both workers and the public. 
Key failings were:
· The Designer failed to provide a full engineering spe-
ci fication for the structure which would have included 
load calculations in various wind conditions. From this 
the required tethering configuration could have been 
scientifically deter mined. The Designer’s risk assessment 
stated that 40 tethers would be required for the structure 
distributed around the perimeter but only 22 were used 
by the Contract Company.
· The Contract Company did not require the Designer to 
supply a suitable specification containing the loading 
calculations to inform the location of  the tethers. In 
addition, only 22 tethers were located after the incident. 
The Contract Company did not undertake a suitable and 
sufficient risk assessment of the stability of the structure 
and the likely hazard to members of the public should it 
become unstable.
· The Public Park Authority took advice from a Safety 
Advisory Group. This was a multi-agency group to 
provide advice on public event safety. However, the focus 
of  the group’s risk assessment was event management 
in terms of  crowd management, people flow through 
the structure etc. The group did not have the structural 
engineering expertise to cover the stability of the struc-
ture and did not require evidence from the Designer or 
the Contract Company that the appropriate load cal-
culations had been undertaken and verified, and that 
the structure would be appropriately secured to ensure 
stability.
This accident was completely avoidable. All three of the 
parties listed above had a responsibility to ensure the structure 
was safe but not one of them did so. There was also a failure 
of the parties involved to communicate to one another about 
possible risks.
Case Study 2: ICL Plastics, 
May 2004, 9 Fatalities, 33 Injured
ICL Plastics had a factory in Glasgow where there was an 
explosion that demolished the building killing 9 workers and 
injuring a further 33 people. Fig. 9 show the factory following 
the explosion.
HSL undertook an investigation and determined that 
the cause of  the explosion was due to an underground pipe 
carrying Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) which had corroded. The 
corroded pipe allowed LPG to leak out, the LPG had col lected 
in the basement of  the building and, on reaching an ignition 
source, the gas ignited resulting in the explosion and de molition 
of the building. The corroded pipe is shown in Fig. 10.Fig. 8. Dreamspace lifted up to a near vertical position.
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review of  the risk assessment records indicated that corro-
sion of  this pipe, and the subsequent hazards resulting from 
any corrosion, had not been identified. Investigation of  the 
historical context indicated that the pipes were installed cor-
rectly and to the appropriate standard of  the time (the pipes 
were installed in 1969). 
In this case, the employer forgot Step 5 of  HSE’s Five 
Step Risk Assessment Process, that is ‘to continually review 
and update the risk assessment at suitable time intervals’. Once 
the pipes had been installed, no system was put in place to 
reassess the safety of the pipes as time elapsed. This accident 
was completely avoidable as a suitable and effective risk as-
sessment would have identified corrosion as a hazard and a 
suitable maintenance regime, as the risk mitigation, would have 
prevented the LPG leak.
Case Study 3: Nimrod, 
September 2006, 14 Fatalities
The Nimrod aircraft, shown in Fig. 11, was undergoing in-
flight refuelling when a fire broke out killing all on board. HSE 
did not undertake the investigation [11] (air accidents being 
outside its regulatory remit) but the lessons from the incident 
are very relevant to all employers. The investigation identified 
that fuel leaked out of a coupling during the in-flight refuelling. 
This leaked fuel was close to hot pipe-work (not part of  the 
refuelling system) which provided an ignition source. This is 
shown in Fig. 12.
The Nimrod aircraft had been in service for over 30 years 
and had been modified twice. These modifications made the 
Fig. 10: The Corroded Pipe which Leaked 
LPG Causing the Explosion
Analysis of  the maintenance records indicated that no main-
tenance of this buried pipe had been undertaken. In addi tion, 
Fig. 11. Nimrod: mid air refuelling.
Fig. 10. Corroded pipe.
Fig. 9. ICL plastics factory.
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aircraft unsafe, but this wasn’t identified. A suitable and suf-
ficient risk assessment (called a Safety Case for large, high 
hazard plant) was not completed following the modifications. 
Subsequent maintenance records showed evidence of fuel leaks 
that had happened before but these were not acted upon. 
As with the other case studies, this accident was com-
pletely avoidable. There were three failings in this example (1) 
a failure to undertake suitable and sufficient risk assessment at 
the design stage of the modifications to the aircraft (2) a failure 
to review and act on maintenance data (3) when a retrospective 
Safety Case was undertaken some time after the modified 
aircraft had been in service, maintenance data was not 
appropriately collected and reviewed to inform the Safety Case. 
The Nimrod Review Report [11] stated that the failure was one 
of ‘leadership, culture and priorities’. 
Conclusion: Common Pitfalls of 
Risk Assessment and How to Improve
The case studies illustrate some of  the common failing in 
undertaking risk assessments. HSL undertook a Review of 
Risk Assessment Practice in 2002 [12] and identified these and 
further common failings that are listed below:
1) Carrying out a risk assessment to attempt to justify a 
decision that has already been made
2) Using a generic assessment when a site specific as-
sessment is needed
3) Carrying out a detailed Quantitative Risk Assessment 
without first considering whether any relevant good 
practice was applicable, or when relevant good practice 
exists
4) Carrying out a risk assessment using inappropriate 
‘good practice’ (e.g. from another industry. A specific 
approach in industry A may be inappropriate in in-
dustry B).
5) Making decisions on the basis of  individual risk esti-
mates when cumulative risk to society is the appropriate 
measure
6) Only considering the risk from one activity
7) Dividing the time spent on the risk assessment between 
several individuals - this approach to risk estimation 
usually means that risks at interfaces between plant, 
people or processes are missed.
8) Not involving a team of  people in the assessment, or 
not including employees with practical knowledge of 
the process/activity being assessed
9) Ineffective use of consultants
10) Failure to identify all hazards associated with a par-
ticular activity
11) Failure to fully consider all possible outcomes
12) Inappropriate use of data
13) Inappropriate definition of a representative sample of 
events
14) Inappropriate use of risk criteria
15) No consideration of risk reduction SFAIRP or further 
measures that could be taken
16) Inappropriate use of cost benefit analysis
17) Using ‘Reverse SFAIRP’ arguments, (i.e. using cost be-
nefit analysis to attempt to argue that it is acceptable to 
reduce existing safety standards)
18) Failing to act upon the results of the risk assessment
19) Not linking hazards with risk controls
Fig. 12. Nimrod: the accident.
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To undertake a suitable and sufficient risk assessment 
takes time and an appropriate multi-disciplinary team of peo-
ple. There are no short cuts. Good practice is about making the 
commitment to ensuring that risks are as low as is reasonably 
practicable and maintaining that commitment, by risk review 
and mitigation, throughout the life of the activity being under-
taken.
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